Last data update: May 06, 2024. (Total: 46732 publications since 2009)
Records 1-6 (of 6 Records) |
Query Trace: Trujillo AA[original query] |
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Screening for SARS-CoV-2 Infection Within a Psychiatric Hospital and Considerations for Limiting Transmission Within Residential Psychiatric Facilities - Wyoming, 2020.
Callaghan AW , Chard AN , Arnold P , Loveland C , Hull N , Saraiya M , Saydah S , Dumont W , Frakes LG , Johnson D , Peltier R , Van Houten C , Trujillo AA , Moore J , Rose DA , Honein MA , Carrington D , Harrist A , Hills SL . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2020 69 (26) 825-829 In the United States, approximately 180,000 patients receive mental health services each day at approximately 4,000 inpatient and residential psychiatric facilities (1). SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), can spread rapidly within congregate residential settings (2-4), including psychiatric facilities. On April 13, 2020, two patients were transferred to Wyoming's state psychiatric hospital from a private psychiatric hospital that had confirmed COVID-19 cases among its residents and staff members (5). Although both patients were asymptomatic at the time of transfer and one had a negative test result for SARS-CoV-2 at the originating facility, they were both isolated and received testing upon arrival at the state facility. On April 16, 2020, the test results indicated that both patients had SARS-CoV-2 infection. In response, the state hospital implemented expanded COVID-19 infection prevention and control (IPC) procedures (e.g., enhanced screening, testing, and management of new patient admissions) and adapted some standard IPC measures to facilitate implementation within the psychiatric patient population (e.g., use of modified face coverings). To assess the likely effectiveness of these procedures and determine SARS-CoV-2 infection prevalence among patients and health care personnel (HCP) (6) at the state hospital, a point prevalence survey was conducted. On May 1, 2020, 18 days after the patients' arrival, 46 (61%) of 76 patients and 171 (61%) of 282 HCP had nasopharyngeal swabs collected and tested for SARS-CoV-2 RNA by reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction. All patients and HCP who received testing had negative test results, suggesting that the hospital's expanded IPC strategies might have been effective in preventing the introduction and spread of SARS-CoV-2 infection within the facility. In congregate residential settings, prompt identification of COVID-19 cases and application of strong IPC procedures are critical to ensuring the protection of other patients and staff members. Although standard guidance exists for other congregate facilities (7) and for HCP in general (8), modifications and nonstandard solutions might be needed to account for the specific needs of psychiatric facilities, their patients, and staff members. |
Lessons from the reestablishment of Public Health Laboratory activities in Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria
Hardy MC , Stinnett RC , Kines KJ , Rivera-Nazario DM , Lowe DE , Mercante AM , Gonzalez Jimenez N , Cuevas Ruiz RI , Rivera Arbolay HI , Gonzalez Pena RL , Toro M , Trujillo AA , Pappas CL , Llewellyn AC , Candal F , Burgos Garay M , Gomez GA , Concepcion Acevedo J , Ansbro M , Moura H , Shaw MW , Muehlenbachs A , Romanoff LC , Sunshine BJ , Rose DA , Patel A , Shapiro CN , Luna-Pinto SC , Pillai SK , O'Neill E . Nat Commun 2019 10 (1) 2720 Public Health Laboratories (PHLs) in Puerto Rico did not escape the devastation caused by Hurricane Maria. We implemented a quality management system (QMS) approach to systematically reestablish laboratory testing, after evaluating structural and functional damage. PHLs were inoperable immediately after the storm. Our QMS-based approach began in October 2017, ended in May 2018, and resulted in the reestablishment of 92% of baseline laboratory testing capacity. Here, we share lessons learned from the historic recovery of the largest United States' jurisdiction to lose its PHL capacity, and provide broadly applicable tools for other jurisdictions to enhance preparedness for public health emergencies. |
Comparison of nucleic acid extraction methods for next-generation sequencing of avian influenza A virus from ferret respiratory samples.
Di H , Thor S , Trujillo AA , Stark T , Marinova-Petkova A , Jones J , Wentworth DE , Barnes J , Davis CT . J Virol Methods 2019 270 95-105 Influenza A virus is a negative-sense RNA virus with a segmented genome consisting of eight RNA segments. Avian influenza A virus (AIV) primarily infects avian hosts and sporadically infects mammals, which can lead to adaptation to new species. Next-generation sequencing (NGS) of emerging AIV genomes extracted from respiratory samples collected on sequential days from animal models and clinical patients enables analysis of the emergence of evolutionary variants within the virus population over time. However, obtaining codon complete AIV genome at a sufficient coverage depth for nucleotide variant calling remains a challenge, especially from post-inoculation respiratory samples collected at late time points that have low viral titers. In this study, nasal wash samples from ferrets inoculated with different subtypes of AIV were collected on various days post-inoculation. Each nasal wash sample was aliquoted and extracted using five commercially available nucleic acid extraction methods. Extracted influenza virus RNA was amplified and NGS conducted using Illumina Mi-Seq. For each nasal wash sample, completeness of AIV genome segments and coverage depth were compared among five extraction methods. Nucleic acids extracted by MagNA pure compact RNA isolation consistently yielded codon complete sequences for all eight genome segments at the required coverage depth at each time point sampled. The study revealed that DNase treatment was critical to the amplification of influenza genome segments and the downstream success of codon complete NGS from nasal wash samples. The findings from this study can be applied to improve NGS of influenza and other RNA viruses that infect the respiratory tract and are collected from respiratory samples. |
Analysis of influenza viruses from patients clinically suspected of infection with an oseltamivir resistant virus during the 2009 pandemic in the United States.
Nguyen HT , Trujillo AA , Sheu TG , Levine M , Mishin VP , Shaw M , Ades EW , Klimov AI , Fry AM , Gubareva LV . Antiviral Res 2012 93 (3) 381-6 During the 2009 influenza pandemic, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention provided antiviral susceptibility testing for patients infected with suspected drug-resistant viruses. Specimens from 72 patients admitted to an intensive care unit or with a severe immunocompromising condition, who failed to clinically improve after oseltamivir treatment, were accepted for testing. Respiratory specimens were tested for the presence of the oseltamivir resistance-conferring H275Y substitution in the neuraminidase (NA) by pyrosequencing. Virus isolates propagated in MDCK cells were tested in phenotypic NA inhibition (NI) assays using licensed NA inhibitors (NAIs), zanamivir and oseltamivir, and investigational NAIs, peramivir and laninamivir. Conventional sequencing and plaque purification were conducted on a subset of viruses. Pyrosequencing data were obtained for 87 specimens collected from 58 of the 72 (81%) patients. Of all patients, 27 (38%) had at least one specimen in which H275Y was detected. Analysis of sequential samples from nine patients revealed intra-treatment emergence of H275Y variant and a shift from wildtype-to-H275Y in quasispecies during oseltamivir therapy. A shift in the H275Y proportion was observed as a result of virus propagation in MDCK cells. Overall, the NI method was less sensitive than pyrosequencing in detecting the presence of H275Y variants in virus isolates. Using the NI method, isolates containing H275Y variant at 50% exhibited resistance to oseltamivir and peramivir, but retained full susceptibility to zanamivir. H275Y viruses recovered from two patients had an additional substitution I223K or I223R that conferred a 38-52- and 33-97-fold enhancement in oseltamivir- and peramivir-resistance, respectively. These viruses also showed decreased susceptibility to zanamivir and laninamivir. These data suggest that pyrosequencing is a powerful tool for timely detection of NAI resistant viruses and that NI assays are needed for comprehensive testing to detect novel resistance substitutions. |
Comprehensive assessment of 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus drug susceptibility in vitro
Gubareva LV , Trujillo AA , Okomo-Adhiambo M , Mishin VP , Deyde VM , Sleeman K , Nguyen HT , Sheu TG , Garten RJ , Shaw MW , Fry AM , Klimov AI . Antivir Ther 2010 15 (8) 1151-9 BACKGROUND: Antiviral drugs are an important option for managing infections caused by influenza viruses. This study assessed the drug susceptibility of 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) viruses collected globally between April 2009 and January 2010. METHODS: Virus isolates were tested for adamantane susceptibility, using pyrosequencing to detect the S31N marker of adamantane resistance in the M2 protein and biological assays to assess viral replication in cell culture. To assess neuraminidase (NA) inhibitor (NAI) susceptibility, virus isolates were tested in chemiluminescent NA inhibition assays and by pyrosequencing to detect the H275Y (H274Y in N2 numbering) marker of oseltamivir resistance in the NA. RESULTS: With the exception of three, all viruses that were tested for adamantane susceptibility (n=3,362) were resistant to this class of drugs. All viruses tested for NAI susceptibility (n=3,359) were sensitive to two US Food and Drug Administration-approved NAIs, oseltamivir (mean +/-sd 50% inhibitory concentration [IC(50)] 0.25 +/-0.12 nM) and zanamivir (mean IC(50) 0.29 +/-0.09 nM), except 23 (0.7%), which were resistant to oseltamivir, but sensitive to zanamivir. Oseltamivir-resistant viruses had the H275Y mutation in their NA and were detected in patients exposed to the drug through prophylaxis or treatment. NA activity of all viruses was inhibited by the NAIs peramivir, laninamivir (R-125489) and A-315675, except for H275Y variants, which exhibited approximately 100-fold reduction in peramivir susceptibility. CONCLUSIONS: This report provides data regarding antiviral susceptibility of 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) surveillance viruses, the majority of which were resistant to adamantanes and sensitive to NAIs. These findings provide information essential for antiviral resistance monitoring and development of novel diagnostic tests for detecting influenza antiviral resistance. |
Detection of molecular markers of drug resistance in the 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) viruses using pyrosequencing
Deyde VM , Sheu TG , Trujillo AA , Okomo-Adhiambo M , Garten R , Klimov AI , Gubareva LV . Antimicrob Agents Chemother 2009 54 (3) 1102-10 BACKGROUND: M2 blockers, amantadine and rimantadine, and neuraminidase (NA) inhibitors (NAIs), oseltamivir and zanamivir, are FDA-approved for control of influenza A virus infections. The 2009 pandemic viruses (H1N1pdm) are reassortants that acquired M and NA gene segments from a Eurasian adamantane resistant swine virus. NAI-resistance in the H1N1pdm viruses has been rare and is mainly limited to oseltamivir exposed patients. The pyrosequencing assay has been proven a useful tool in surveillance for drug resistance in seasonal influenza A viruses. METHOD: Here we provide a protocol which allows detection of adamantane resistance markers as well as the I43T change- which is unique to the H1N1pdm M2 protein. The protocol also allows detection of changes at residues V116, I117, E119, Q136, K150, D151, D199, I223, H275, and N295 in the NA, known to alter NAI drug susceptibility. RESULTS: We report here detection of the first cases of the oseltamivir resistance mutation H275Y and the change I223V in viruses from the US using the approach described in this study. Moreover, the assay permits a quick identification of the major NA group (V106/N248, I106/D248, or I106/N248) to which a pandemic virus belongs. CONCLUSIONS: pyrosequencing is well suited for detection of drug resistance markers and signature mutations in the M and NA of the pandemic H1N1 influenza viruses. |
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